. Until now, there have been 27,013 reported cases and 11,134 deaths. The origin of the virus is thought to have been a zoonotic transmission from a bat to a twoyear-old boy in December 2013 (ref. 2). From this index case the virus was spread by human-to-human contact throughout Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, the origin of the particular virus in each country and time of transmission is not known and currently relies on epidemiological analysis, which may be unreliable owing to the difficulties of obtaining patient information. Here we trace the genetic evolution of EBOV in the current outbreak that has resulted in multiple lineages. Deep sequencing of 179 patient samples processed by the European Mobile Laboratory, the first diagnostics unit to be deployed to the epicentre of the outbreak in Guinea, reveals an epidemiological and evolutionary history of the epidemic from March 2014 to January 2015. Analysis of EBOV genome evolution has also benefited from a similar sequencing effort of patient samples from Sierra Leone. Our results confirm that the EBOV from Guinea moved into Sierra Leone, most likely in April or early May. The viruses of the Guinea/ Sierra Leone lineage mixed around June/July 2014. Viral sequences covering August, September and October 2014 indicate that this lineage evolved independently within Guinea. These data can be used in conjunction with epidemiological information to test retrospectively the effectiveness of control measures, and provides an unprecedented window into the evolution of an ongoing viral haemorrhagic fever outbreak.
We used a deep sequencing approach to gain insight into the evolution of Ebola virus (EBOV) in Guinea from the ongoing West African outbreak. This was an approach based on analysis pipelines developed for a guinea-pig model of EBOV infection and Hendra virus infection of human and bat cells 4, 5 . Here we use this approach to derive consensus EBOV genomes from individual patient samples that can be used to study viral genome evolution during the course of the outbreak. Viral genomes were derived primarily from blood samples that had been taken from patients in Guinea and sent to the European Mobile Laboratory (EMLab), deployed by the World Health Organisation within the Médecins Sans Frontières Ebola Treatment Centre Guéckédou in March 2014 to aid the diagnostic effort. With the permission of Guinean authorities a biobank of samples was assembled which had known provenance of EBOV infection. Linked to each sample were the following data: patient location (to district level), sample collection date, disease onset and outcome. The collection dates were a median of 4 days after the date of onset of symptoms. Baseline data was cleaned, formatted and imported into the Geographic Information System, ESRI ArcGIS. Statistical tools were used to generate tabular output and to join the numeric case data with the district level boundaries of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (district geometries freely available from http://www.gadm.org/) (Fig. 1a) .
The viral genome sequence was derived from RNA sequencing analysis of the patient samples with no pre-amplification of the viral genome. In general we selected a range of samples from both males and females of different ages and a fair representation of sequences for each month (Extended Data Fig. 1) , and with C t values less than 20 for EBOV RNA. In this selected patient cohort, with a relatively high viral load, there was approximately 80% mortality. The read depth mapping to the EBOV genome varied between samples and regions in the genome (Fig. 1b) and in general the number of sequence reads obtained for each genome correlated with the amount of viral load as determined by quantitative reverse-transcription PCR (qRT-PCR) (Fig. 1c) .
Phylogenetic analysis revealed the dynamic nature of the epidemic and molecular change in the viral sequence ( . A second lineage, B, emerged in May and June and comprises all the sequences from Gire et al. 6 and the remainder of those described In red is shown the uniformity of the depth across individual genomes, although the median number of reads per nucleotide position had a variation spanning over four log 10 units. c, Linear regression of the log 10 median sequence depth of each virus isolate versus the C t value of the viral load as determined by qRT-PCR. Red dots indicate samples taken from patients who went on to survive EBOV infection and grey shaded dots are from patients who records suggest died from EBOV infection. . A number of lineages predominantly circulating in Guinea are denoted as GN1-4 along with a uniquely Sierra Leone lineage (SL3) recognised in Gire et al. Shown is a maximum clade credibility tree constructed from 10,000 trees sampled from the posterior distribution with mean node ages. Clades described in Gire et al. 6 are identified here (SL1, SL2 and SL3) as well as a number of lineages predominantly circulating in Guinea and posterior probability support is given for these. For certain key node ages, 95% credible intervals are shown by horizontal bars. No further EBOV genomes that we sequenced from samples taken after July 2014 belonged to lineage A. This clade was likely to have been associated with the original outbreak in Guinea and was almost successfully contained in May 2014 by the interventions of the multi-agency response. Two clusters of Sierra Leone viruses described by Gire et al. 6 (denoted by the authors as clusters SL1 and SL2), both of which contain later viruses from Guinea and Liberia, suggest continued spread across the border during this time. Early cases in SL1 and SL2 were both associated with a single funeral 6 , so it is possible that this event may have reignited the epidemic. Thereafter, lineage B spread into Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This lineage is associated with the large epidemics in these three countries and persisted into 2015. The spatiotemporal spread of these viruses based on the phylogenetic analysis presented in Figs 2a and 3 was summarized (Extended Data Fig. 3) and indicated how the virus may have spread between the neighbouring countries. There was no evidence from the data that increases or decreases in mortality were associated with any particular virus cluster (Extended Data Fig. 4) .
The Bayesian time-scaled phylogenetic analysis estimated an average rate of evolution over the genome of 1.42 3 10 23 substitutions per site per year with 95% credible intervals of 1.22 3 10 23 and 1.62 3 10
23
. Details of the model assumptions are given in the Methods section. This rate is lower than that initially described for the West African outbreak by Gire et al. 6 but still higher than the long-term, between-outbreak rate of 0.8 3 10
23 estimated using viruses back to the 1976 Yambuku outbreak 6 . This apparent drop in rate of evolution between these two studies is consistent with the explanation provided by Gire et al. 6 that the short sampling interval (March to June) provided insufficient time for the action of purifying selection. However, the much longer sampling interval in the present study may simply be providing a more precise estimate of the rate. It should be noted, however, that the between-outbreak rate will exclusively reflect transmission and evolution that has occurred in the non-human reservoir species, so may not be directly comparable to the rate within a human outbreak. We observed no evidence of a change in evolutionary rate over the course of the epidemic with the accumulation of genetic change having a linear relationship with time ( Fig. 2b) , confirming that the apparent decline in rate between the two studies is an observational phenomenon 7 rather than a change in the virus. (Fig. 4) . While there is amino acid variation in all of the genomes sampled, there were very few changes in viral protein 30 (VP30), viral protein 40 (VP40) and viral protein 24 (VP24), and these changes are only in less than ,2% of the genomes sampled. However, a single amino acid substitution in VP24 is associated with adaptation to a new host 4, 8 , and this may be due to interactions with host-cell proteins 9, 10 . While some of the variation may be attributed to a purely random molecular clock pattern, in GP, VP35, NP and L there are some amino acid variations that are present in over ,15% of the genomes sampled. For example, in GP there is an A to V substitution in ,70.5% of the genomes sampled compared to the reference genome. Implications of the mutations within GP in relation to immune escape of therapeutics and vaccines will need to be assessed in pseudotype neutralization assays using EBOV monoclonal antibodies and serum from people who have been vaccinated.
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